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LAW, MEDIA, & ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: 




Abstract: The functional linkages between law and media have long 
been signiªcant in shaping American democratic governance. Over the 
past thirty-ªve years, environmental analysis has similarly become essen-
tial to shaping international and domestic governmental policy. Envi-
ronmentalism—focusing as it does on realistic interconnected account-
ing of the full potential negative consequences as well as beneªts of 
proposed actions, policies, and programs, over the long term as well as 
the short term, with careful consideration of all realistic alternatives— 
provides a legal perspective important for societal sustainability. Because 
environmental values and norms are often in tension with established 
industrial interests that resist public interest accountability, they are in-
evitably forced to play on political battleªelds dominated by lobbyists’ 
spin and corporate stratagems for manipulating public perceptions. The 
press, to which Thomas Jefferson entrusted the critical task of “inform-
ing the discretion” of the populace, is a crucially important and often 
disappointing resource of democratic governance, not least in the area 
of environmental law. This Essay surveys these problems and explores 
the potential for environmental lawyers to improve the relationships 
among environmental analysis, media, and societal governance at both 
the “micro” level of daily practice and “macro” level of national policy 
and law-making. 
                                                                                                                      
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. S.J.D., University of Michigan Law 
School, 1983; L.L.M., University of Michigan Law School, 1973, J.D. Yale Law School, 1968; 
A.B., Princeton University, 1965. The Author wishes to thank the editors of the Boston Col-
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Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Essay, Law and the Fourth Estate: Endangered Nature, the Press, and the 
Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 Envtl. L. 1 (2002). The Author also expresses his 
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The free press is an absolute value not only because the unfettered ºow of 
information is essential to the republican system, nor only because the 
fourth estate serves as a check on the power of the other three, but because 
public expression is necessary for the communal self-awareness that keeps 
the body politic alive. . . . The news media do for democracy what liturgy 
does for religion; what poetry does for experience; what gesture does for feel-
ing. With words out of silence, the press tells you who you are.1
Introduction 
 In all modern industrial democracies, and perhaps especially to-
day in this country, law and media are inextricably joined as two fun-
damental elements of the structure and process of societal govern-
ance. The volatility of decisional processes in the legislative and 
administrative spheres, the systemic role of public opinion polls, and 
the use of spin in modern governmental decisionmaking, all reºect 
the signiªcance of perceived public opinion in shaping outcomes in 
the governance process. 
 Environmental analysis has also been deªning for itself a funda-
mentally linked role in societal governance, whether or not that role 
is so recognized. Environmentalism is a strategically rational way of 
analyzing the changing and interrelated complexities of world condi-
tions, with the hope of navigating our society—through science, law, 
and government—toward sustainable, long-term survival. Environ-
mentalism is not a narrow, marginalized niche of tree-hugging hippy 
Luddites.2 One need only think of global warming and hurricanes, 
escalating ºood hazards caused by wetland destruction and unwise 
land-use patterns, increases in latent genetic and developmental 
health hazards, chemical reactions in human hormonal and immune 
systems, and the far-ranging effects of environmental pollution. For 
years, these and many other environmental concerns were dismissed 
                                                                                                                      
1 James Carroll, The Fall of Bob Woodward, Boston Globe, Nov. 21, 2005, at A15. 
2 Beginning in the 1970s, an industry-led political initiative to “take America back” from 
the perceived progressive excesses of the 1960s successfully constructed a movement of coali-
tions, think tanks, strategic alliances with evangelicals and others distressed by social disrup-
tions, and media specialists to create the potent political force that took over national power 
in 2000. See Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas: How Conservatives Won 
the Heart of America (2004); John Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Right 
Nation (2004); Zygmunt J. B. Plater, Dealing with Dumb and Dumber: The Continuing Mission of 
Citizen Environmentalism, 20 J. Envtl L. & Litig. 9 (2005). At the core of this resurgent politi-
cal movement has been an insistent antiregulatory agenda, reºected in unprecedentedly 
broad initiatives to undercut environmental and other progressive regulatory protections 
that prior to the turn of the century had been consolidated into our legal system through 
forty or more years of bipartisan efforts. 
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by industry lobbyists and public relations agents as Chicken Little 
alarmism.3 Now an avalanche of environmental science is receiving 
belated public recognition, signaling an inescapably broad, society-wide 
emphasis on the integration of environmental principles and analysis 
into public policy. 
 This Essay examines the relationships among law, media, and en-
vironmental analysis, analyzed from a generally public-interest pro-
environmental protection perspective, at both the macro level of na-
tional and international concern—such as global warming and endo-
crine disruptors in national food supplies—and the micro level of on-
the-ground lawyering in litigation and local governance. 
I. At the Micro Level: Law, Media, and Environmentalism  
in Local Practice 
 Consider Escamilla v. ASARCO, a classic but unreported law-of-
neighbors-type 1993 pollution case from Colorado.4 Escamilla arose in 
Globeville, a run-down, low-income, minority neighborhood in the 
northern fringes of Denver.5 A number of polluting industries existed 
                                                                                                                      
3 Global warming is a good example. Environmentalists ªrst began to analyze the 
greenhouse effect of carbon dioxide in 1978. One day in October 1978, Rafe Pomerance, 
then the young President of Friends of the Earth, burst into the organization’s small Wash-
ington D.C. ofªce after an informal brieªng with RAND Corporation scientists, and 
shouted, “Hold onto your hats: Do you know what really’s going to get us all? I’ve just 
learned: It’s carbon dioxide!” Through Pomerance’s efforts, reporter Phil Shabecoff of the 
New York Times was the ªrst national journalist to research the story. But, as Chris Mooney 
notes, the oil, gas, and electric utility industries soon launched a climate change denial 
campaign which has persevered into the twenty-ªrst century, characterizing the analyses 
linking global warming with carbon emissions as scientiªcally unsound radical extremism. 
See Chris Mooney, Some Like It Hot, Mother Jones, May-June 2005, at 36, 36 (noting how 
Exxon-Mobil funded more than forty advocacy groups and media task forces to discredit 
the science of global warming). For several weeks, even the New York Times hesitated about 
running Shabecoff’s world scoop on global warming, ªnally printing it with no fanfare in 
the back pages of the paper. Interview with Philip Shabecoff, Reporter, N.Y. Times, at the 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review Symposium, in Newton, Mass. (Oct. 6, 
2005); see Philip Shabecoff, Scientists Warn U.S. of Carbon Dioxide Peril, N.Y. Times, July 10, 
1979, at D7. 
4 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law & Policy: Nature, Law, & 
Society 169–70 (3d ed. 2004) (quoting Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., No. 91-CV-5716 (D. 
Colo. Apr. 23, 1993)). 
5 Plater et al., supra note 4, at 169; Deborah Houy, Trial by Fire: Court Case Against 
Mining Company, Buzzworm, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 24, 24. Globeville’s population was com-
prised of 64% Hispanic, 9% Native American, 5% African American residents, and the 
remainder was largely Slavic in origin, comprised of low-income workers whose families 
had come to this country to work in the mines and smelters. Robin Chotzinoff, Globeville 
Warming: Despite Recent Turf War, Residents Are Deeply Rooted in This Neighborhood, Denver 
Westword, Dec. 6, 1995, at 17. 
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in and around the neighborhood, but the ASARCO smelter was the 
most notorious. Over the past seventy years it had been emitting arse-
nic, lead, electrolytic acids, cadmium, and other heavy metals into the 
air and soils surrounding the plant.6 Each of these substances is toxic to 
human beings and other living things, and each substance is physically 
detrimental to real and personal property. The Globeville neighbor-
hood was heavily polluted, particularly with toxic cadmium in dust 
form entering plaintiffs’ homes and penetrating deep into the soils of 
their gardens and yards.7 The contamination fostered a sense of stigma 
and powerlessness among the citizens of Globeville.8
 The opposing parties in the Globeville contamination controversy 
were so disproportionately situated in terms of resources and political 
clout that it was likely that the plaintiffs would get little or no satisfac-
tion from the ofªcial legal process.9 The citizens were poor and under-
represented.10 The company was a major transnational corporation 
producing materials for the modern industrial economy.11 The state 
and federal agencies regulating pollution were seemingly beset with 
inertia. 
 In their courtroom effort to halt and clean up ASARCO’s pollu-
tion, the citizens were represented by a ªrm of public interest lawyers 
who not only had similarly limited resources and political clout, but 
also had a serious contextual litigation problem: although many com-
munity inhabitants exhibited fair to poor health proªles, there was a 
serious proof-of-causation problem. No clear cases of sicknesses could 
be readily attributed to ASARCO’s pollution without impossibly ex-
pensive epidemiological studies.12 Additionally, because Globeville 
                                                                                                                      
6 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 169; Jennifer L. Johnson, Comment, Empowerment 
Lawyering: The Role of Trial Publicity in Environmental Justice, 23 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 567, 
590 (1996). 
7 See Chotzinoff, supra note 5, at 17. 
8 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 590–91. 
9 See id. at 590–91, 596. 
10 See id. at 590. 
11 See Chotzinoff, supra note 5, at 17. Cadmium has a wide variety of industrial uses, 
from paints to exotic alloys used in scientiªc and high technology applications. See We-
bElements, Cadmium, http://www.webelements.com/webelements/elements/print/Cd/ 
uses.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2006). 
12 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 227. In this regard the Globeville case is typical of 
many localized toxic contamination cases, including the Woburn well-pollution litigation 
chronicled in Jonathan Harr’s A Civil Action and the movie by the same name. In the Wo-
burn litigation, because the trial judge polyfurcated the case, the plaintiffs never got to try 
their case on probable causation of leukemia and other health effects. See Albert P. Bede-
carré, Comment, Rule 42(b) Bifurcation at an Extreme: Polyfurcation of Liability Issues in Envi-
ronmental Tort Cases, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 123, 145–47 (1989). 
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was a very poor community to begin with, the provable losses of prop-
erty values attributable to the toxic pollution from ASARCO were rela-
tively trivial.13 The Globeville community suffered from exposure to 
potentially dangerous substances, and endured the stigma resulting 
from such exposure, due to its inability—both politically and eco-
nomically—to assert effective claims for a clean environment.14 The 
prospects for injunctive relief or substantial damage awards, however, 
appeared poor indeed. 
 The plaintiffs’ attorneys adopted a novel legal approach by focus-
ing on property contamination, and seeking a restoration remedy.15 In 
addition to the small diminution of property values caused by contami-
nation, the attorneys also sought actual cleanup costs—restoration of 
homes and lands in the neighborhood to an uncontaminated level.16 
Actual restoration of the neighborhood to its physical condition prior 
to contamination, including thorough sanitation of homes and re-
placement of all polluted soils, was a hugely expensive judicial remedy 
not at all justiªed by the relative market values—at least not in cost-
beneªt terms, or under normative principles of tort law.17 In light of 
the social injustice befalling the Globeville residents, however, the at-
torneys sought to apply section 929 of the Restatement of Torts.18 Sec-
                                                                                                                      
13 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 170. The chances of shutting down ASARCO be-
cause of unproven health consequences and lowered property values in a community that 
was already at the bottom of the property value spectrum were low. The value of a con-
taminated home might be reduced from $30,000 to $25,000 in terms of comparative resale 
values. This kind of diminution was insigniªcant in comparison to the multimillion-dollar 
industrial complex, and was unlikely to result in an award of substantial damages, much 
less to persuade a court to shut down a contaminating operation. See id. To avoid the accu-
sation that plaintiffs would enjoy a windfall with no real intent to remediate their property 
once restoration damages were paid, the Escamilla plaintiffs stipulated that members of the 
litigation who did not contract to remediate would receive damage awards discounted by 
forty percent. Ultimately, the parties agreed that ASARCO itself would do the neighbor-
hood’s physical remediation, resulting in an effective and faster restoration process that 
was much less costly to defendant. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Teacher’s Manual 
for Environmental Law & Policy 65–67 (Supplementary Materials, 2d ed. 1998). 
14 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 169–70. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. at 170. 
18 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929(1)(a) prescribes, as to measure of dam-
ages: 
[F]or harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a to-
tal destruction of value, the damages include compensation for (a) the dif-
ference between the value of the land before the harm and the value after the 
harm, or at his election in an appropriate case, the cost of restoration that has 
been or may be reasonably incurred . . . . 
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tion 929 could address the social realities of the case far better than 
standard tort law, and could achieve an expanded internalization of 
social costs—one of the fundamental strategies of modern environ-
mental law.19
 The Globeville plaintiffs’ attorneys realized that media coverage 
would be strategically helpful, if not absolutely indispensable, for their 
innovative approach to be taken seriously.20 Lacking signiªcant funds 
to do scientiªc investigations and technological proofs, they had to lev-
erage the dramatic victimization of a helpless, low-income community, 
in order to draw serious attention to their novel legal claims.21 The 
plaintiffs’ attorneys consciously shaped a constructive media strategy.22 
The goal was to project into public opinion an appreciation of the con-
trast between a huge transnational company, and the abject vulnerabil-
ity of a low-income community of color, which was being forced to ab-
sorb the corporation’s externalized pollution.23 Drawing upon 
increasing public recognition that toxic emissions and toxic waste re-
positories were generally located in low-income communities of color, 
the attorneys emphasized the economic deprivations and racial charac-
teristics of the plaintiffs’ neighborhood to the media using the rhetoric 
of “environmental justice” and “environmental racism.”24
 ASARCO, the corporate defendant, reacted quickly to this media 
strategy.25 On motion of defendant’s counsel, the trial judge issued a 
gag order: plaintiffs’ attorneys were not to mention that this was an en-
vironmental justice case with overtones of race and poverty.26 In re-
sponse, the plaintiffs’ attorneys arranged for at least a dozen neighbor-
hood residents to be present each day in the courtroom, sitting 
together in a highly visible group, naturally representing the minority 
                                                                                                                      
• Id. (emphasis added). 
19 See id. 
20 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 596. 
21 See id. at 596–97. 
22 See id. at 590. The lead attorney was Macon Cowles, Jr., who has litigated a number 
of signiªcant environmental cases involving air and water pollution and endangered wild-
life. 
23 Telephone Interview with Macon Cowles, Jr., Globeville plaintiffs’ lead attorney 
(Oct. 4, 2005); Telephone Interview with Susan Reardon O’Neal, Globeville plaintiffs’ 
attorney ( Jan. 1992). 
24 Telephone Interview with Macon Cowles, Jr., supra note 23; Telephone Interview 
with Susan Reardon O’Neal, supra note 23. 
25 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 591. 
26 Telephone Interview with Macon Cowles, Jr., supra note 23; Telephone Interview 
with Susan Reardon O’Neal, supra note 23. 
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and socioeconomic proªle of the town.27 Neither the jury nor the re-
porters watching the trial could fail to see the juxtaposition represented 
by the plaintiffs’ confrontation with the smelter. 
 The Escamilla attorneys further recognized that exposure on the 
local evening news would help raise an atmosphere of criticism of the 
defendant’s smelter.28 The lead attorney, Macon Cowles, gave an in-
terview to a local television reporter summarizing the case: “we are 
trying to potty-train a Fortune 500 company.”29
 This vivid and effective media quote immediately caught the atten-
tion of important editors and producers. The defendant corporation’s 
attorneys, however, immediately ªled a grievance in response to the 
quote.30 According to ASARCO, the plaintiffs’ attorneys were being 
unprofessional and defamatory.31 Cowles’s comments went beyond 
matters on the court record, which presumably had mentioned noth-
ing about potties.32 Such statements were prejudicial to the jury’s con-
sideration of the matter. If the neighborhood plaintiffs could ªnd the 
means, defendant implied, they were welcome to hire a public relations 
staff to manage press coverage, as the industrial defendant had done. 
The plaintiffs’ attorneys, however, could not in good practice act as 
press agents for the neighborhood by being spokespersons to the me-
dia.33 The grievance was ultimately rejected, and the trial progressed, 
with the Globeville contamination becoming a long-running local me-
dia story.34 Ultimately, the jury got the message, delivering a pioneering 
“restoration damages” award of approximately $28 million, far in excess 
of the plaintiffs’ actual market-value losses.35
II. Some Observations on Environmental Law and Media  
at the Micro Level 
 Media coverage is almost always an afªrmative element—and is 
sometimes an indispensable determinant—for public interest envi-
                                                                                                                      
27 Telephone Interview with Macon Cowles, Jr., supra note 23; Telephone Interview 
with Susan Reardon O’Neal, supra note 23. 
28 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 596–97. 






35 In fact the costs awarded for restoration exceeded the total value of plaintiffs’ prop-
erty; however, the court nevertheless held that, in these circumstances, the sum was not 
excessive. Plater et al., supra note 4, at 170. 
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ronmental attorneys in litigation, as well as for those doing legislative, 
administrative, and political work. This is as true at the local level as at 
the national level. Surveying a host of local environmental law cases in 
all three branches of government and in public education political ini-
tiatives,36 in virtually every case there has been a sense of traction—of 
being taken seriously and building momentum—when press coverage 
gave these projects intelligent and timely coverage. Conversely, experi-
ence also shows that when environmental lawyers cannot persuade the 
press to examine their issues, or cannot persuade editors to stay with a 
story, they are often unable to build credibility and hold off the usually 
better-ªnanced, more-established opponents of state and local envi-
ronmental protection. 
 How can environmental attorneys maximize the likelihood of 
getting useful media treatment? They can prepare and communicate 
explanations of environmental cases and controversies with graphics 
and vivid explanations, in terms that will frame the issues for all audi-
ences— ranging from reporters and aldermen to corporate ofªcials, 
legislators, agency staffers, and the participants encountered in nego-
tiations, judicial proceedings, and political settings. A well-made chart 
or strategically enlarged photograph hanging on an easel or wall can 
focus attention, frame issues, and shape the alternative outcomes un-
der consideration. A clearly written exegesis of a controversy can draw 
attention to the core issue and to the weaknesses of opposing posi-
tions. The explanation should always be consolidated on paper in a 
form that can be handed out and carried away. Particularly effective 
graphic exhibits should not be presented only in the ofªcial forum, 
but should subsequently be made available in regular page-sized for-
mat for reporters as well as members of committees and juries. At one 
of the earliest state rulemaking hearings at which my students 
testiªed, a reporter angrily commented after the excellent testimony 
that “in the future you should tell them never to come to one of these 
hearings without a one-page handout that sets out some of the quota-
tions they plan to say, and spells their names right.”37 All media-based 
strategies for public interest causes should adopt this advice, and 
                                                                                                                      
36 My students and I have worked on issues including billboard removal, erosion and 
sedimentation controls, regulation of conºicts between ªshermen and canoeists on con-
gested rivers, industrial pollution, returnable bottles and beverage cans, land-use conºicts, 
mining and irrigation problems, state ªsheries regulation, wetlands protections, park and 
recreation issues, among others. 
37 Interview with Glen Sheppard, Reporter, North Woods Call, in Lansing, Mich. (May 
1974). 
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should also include at least one map, chart, or photo in the printed 
handout. Additionally, every complaint in a public interest environ-
mental case should be drafted so that the ªrst three or four para-
graphs of the statement of the case would look suitable at the start of 
the Associated Press story on the case.38
 At both the local and national level, the ability to frame the pub-
lic image and context of each issue for the press—and, through the 
press, the legal process and the public—is an essential element of ef-
fective interaction with the media.39 If, for instance, an environmental 
issue can be framed as “tree-hugging” by its opponents, the effect will 
be to undercut its credibility. If it can be framed as a matter of public 
health risk, it is likely to gain traction. If the story of the Globeville 
residents had been framed as “a group of plaintiffs with no provable 
health conditions and trivial property losses seek to extort unconscion-
able damages from a major local employer,” the public reaction would 
have been far different from the story as it was in fact framed: poor 
citizens of color, suffering decades of government neglect and overt, 
acknowledged, toxic pollution from a big company that refuses to take 
responsibility for its emissions.40
 This use of framing issues to explain media and public reactions 
to civic issues reºects the realistic perceptions most recently explored 
by Professor George Lakoff and the Rockridge Institute.41 Lakoff sug-
                                                                                                                      
38 In arguing a case involving a small endangered ªsh against a purportedly signiªcant 
federal agency dam, I supplied the clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court with several page-sized 
reproductions of a lithographed exhibit at trial, which depicted the ªsh as quite alive and 
attractive in its natural habitat. When the exhibit was mentioned during oral argument 
before the Court, the clerk jumped up and distributed a copy of the colored print to each 
Justice. For a judge to look into the eyes of this creature and sign its death warrant seemed 
much more difªcult than if the case had been presented only in a context of verbal ab-
stractions. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
39 See George Lakoff, Simple Framing: An Introduction to Framing and Its Use in Politics, 
Rockridge Inst., http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/simple_framing/ 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2006). 
40 Had the issue been framed differently, the ultimate judgment likely would have 
been quite different as well. See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 169–70. 
41 George Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame 
the Debate: The Essential Guide for Progressives (2004); see also Lakoff, supra note 
39. Professor Lakoff studies how the industrial coalition that organized in the early 1970s 
with an agenda of building a conservative movement to take power in national politics 
consistently employed sophisticated techniques of word-spinning so as to make regressive 
policies seem quite progressive or benign. See generally Lakoff, supra. He follows this fram-
ing technique through examples from the current administration’s misleading labels for 
its regressive policies under monikers such as “Healthy Forests Initiative,” “No Child Left 
Behind,” “Clear Skies Initiative,” “Endangered Species Recovery,” and “tax relief” efforts. 
Id. 
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gests that the way issues in public forums are framed may ultimately 
be the most important element in determining the resolution.42 
Awareness and conscious planning of media communication is there-
fore a frequent necessity in shaping both local practice and national 
policy. A phone call to a reporter may often yield a fast response and 
resolution for what otherwise may have taken months to achieve un-
der ordinary procedures.43 Legal professionals working for the public 
interest must learn how to manage the broad spectrum of the media 
with greater sophistication.44
 Some basic principles about the relationship between law and 
media apply equally well at the local level and the macro stage of na-
tional policy. For example, the process of daily governance at any 
level—local, state, national, or international—tends to be a process of 
contending forces.45 Anyone who has practiced law in a political capi-
tal and has seen the process of lawmaking—for anything from agricul-
ture to the tax code—has witnessed how the actual political players 
and true outcomes rarely resemble the fact-based, deliberative form 
of republican governance portrayed in eighth-grade civics books. The 
United States theoretically has a “di-polar” system. On the one hand, 
there are marketplace forces that produce dynamic economic activity 
and growth but also threaten public welfare.46 On the other hand, 
government agencies and ofªcial structures are supposed to protect 
civic values and the public interest by maintaining vigilant monitoring 
and regulation of market failure situations.47 Political scientists, how-
ever, note that over time, a “capture” phenomenon often occurs, in 
which the ofªcial players in the public agencies and the private mar-
ketplace structures they are supposed to regulate come together.48 
                                                                                                                      
42 See Lakoff, supra note 39. 
43 In working on a project to protect a valley, my students and I learned from an inter-
nal leak that the development agency we opposed was starting discussions on siting a re-
gional toxic waste treatment facility in the project area, in order to stimulate revenues. Just 
one call to the local United Press International reporter, however, was sufªcient to gener-
ate an avalanche of criticism that ended the ill-conceived proposal within a day. See Steve 
Holland, Trading Away an Eagle Just to Get an Old Crow, United Press Int’l, Sept. 28, 1982. 
44 Professor Charlotte Ryan and John Stanton’s contributions to this Symposium detail 
some of the pathways for lawyers to develop media effectiveness. Charlotte Ryan & Samuel 
Alexander, “Reframing” the Presentation of Environmental Law and Policy, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. 
L. Rev. 563 (2006); John M. Stanton, Environmental Attorneys and the Media: Guidelines for 
Effectiveness, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 593 (2006). 
45 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 80 (discussing how major policy issues are con-
tested between blocs of established “insiders” and outsiders). 
46 Id. at 80–81. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. at 81, 401–02. 
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Left to their own devices, the public and private “ofªcial” players in 
the di-polar rubric are unlikely to sufªciently enforce the public in-
terest, unless outsiders—members of the public—can effectively force 
counterpressures and counterarguments into the governing system.49
 Since 1970, active citizen environmentalists have helped create a 
“multi-centric” governance process and have been a dominant con-
tending force, pushing the creation and enforcement of environ-
mental laws across a wide spectrum of legal processes.50 The heady 
media eruption that greeted Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and the 
early celebrations of Earth Day demonstrate how important media 
relations have been in this process.51 These citizen environmentalists, 
whether individually or in public interest law ªrms, have almost always 
been outsiders with relatively few resources, but have nonetheless 
played a signiªcant role, shifting America toward a more pluralistic 
democratic model.52
 The environmental law evolution in the American legal process 
generally began very much at the micro level, with lawsuits at the 
community level, often based on public nuisance actions addressing 
local pollution issues as in Escamilla v. ASARCO.53 From the very be-
ginning, media coverage at the local as well as the national level was a 
critically important part of the development of environmental law, 
bringing a sense of legitimacy and practicality to efforts that a decade 
earlier would have been regarded as quixotic and illegitimate.54 In 
modern governance generally, facts are vital to progressive outcomes, 
and if full public interest facts are widely perceived, it generally 
changes and improves the process of determining what will occur in 
the legal process of governance. 
 Questions of legal ethics, as well as issues of democratic govern-
ance, are raised by attorneys’ interactions with the media, particularly 
in the courtroom setting. As was the case in Escamilla v. ASARCO, 55 
environmental attorneys’ use of the media in pollution litigation can 
indeed raise challenging questions of ethics and professional conduct. 
                                                                                                                      
49 See id. at 377–78. 
50 Id. 
51 See Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (1962). This book galvanized a strong media re-
action that helped build a mass popular constituency for environmental protection, me-
morialized in the ªrst Earth Day. See Theo Colborn et al., Our Stolen Future 51 
(1997); Plater et al., supra note 4, at 12–13. 
52 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 376–78. 
53 See id. at 104–07, 169–70. 
54 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 41–48. 
55 No. 91-CV-5716 (D. Colo. Apr. 23, 1993) 
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Under the then-current Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, for 
example, it was not clear to what extent the Globeville plaintiffs’ pub-
lic interest attorneys could speak to the press on behalf of unempow-
ered clients, beyond matters directly on the public record. 
 To what extent is it legitimate for attorneys to make conscious use 
of the media in the course of a trial? Litigation in modern American 
society is a function of public debate on a larger scale. Therefore, it 
can be argued that using media techniques to raise public awareness, 
so as to educate the public,56 is both acceptable and inevitable. The 
media’s marketplace of ideas, moreover, can indeed usefully function 
as a two-way street. For example, on several occasions media coverage 
of a contested issue encouraged members of the public to bring facts 
to the attention of the parties and the court that might never other-
wise have been known; generally, such functions of media coverage 
are benign.57
 But what about an attorney’s use of media to “raise the con-
sciousness” of the judge and jury? In cases of great public controversy, 
judges often order the sequestration of juries to insulate them from 
gaining information or slanted analysis from press coverage.58 In most 
cases, however, the judge and jury are subjected to the full barrage of 
media coverage generated by a case, almost inevitably affecting their 
judgment, no matter how much the judge adjures all to reach deci-
sions solely on the basis of the courtroom record.59
 It is not considered improper for the press to convey voluminous 
coverage of a case, provided that the information is derived from listen-
ing to the ofªcial proceedings or from the media’s own investigation. 
To what extent, however, is it improper for attorneys to feed this infor-
mation and analysis, seeking to frame the facts and issues outside the 
courtroom, to encourage press coverage in one direction? The answer 
provided under the currently-prevailing codes and rules of professional 
ethics appears to be that environmental attorneys, acting on behalf of 
their clients and under the protections of the First Amendment, may 
comment on cases in a variety of situations beyond the ofªcial record— 
responding to contrary statements or offering information useful to 
public awareness of risks and other important concerns—provided that 
they do not pass an indistinct boundary of unprofessional conduct in 
                                                                                                                      
56 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2002). 
57 See id. R. 3.6(b). 
58 Gerald T. Wetherington et al., Preparing for the High Proªle Case: An Omnibus Treatment 
for Judges and Lawyers, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 425, 430, 478–79 (1999). 
59 See generally id. 
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“materially prejudicing” the court proceedings.60 This is an unsatisfac-
tory deªnition of boundaries, but it recognizes the reality that attorneys 
inevitably operate in a broader forum than the courtroom alone; re-
verberations of public opinion and public debate are an inevitable part 
of the process. Moreover, for attorneys representing public interest 
plaintiffs who lack economic resources, the option of hiring a public 
relations organization to present the plaintiffs’ case to the public is out 
of the question.61 If the public interest attorney cannot present the 
complexities of the case to the media, in many cases no one in the com-
munity of plaintiffs will be able to do so effectively.62
 Finally, it is important to note that throughout the history of en-
vironmental law, much of the media coverage that helped shape judi-
cial decisions was generated by public interest environmental law 
groups. Whatever the ethics of shaping media coverage to affect a trial 
directly may be, it is clear that efforts of attorneys to shape a national 
atmosphere of reaction against environmental pollution is appropri-
ate, inevitable, and quite effective. 
III. The Macro Level: Law, Media, and Environmentalism at 
the National Level and Beyond 
 The dynamic interplay between law, media, and environmental 
analysis seen in environmental cases at the local level similarly occurs 
at the national and international level. The early years of environ-
mental protection law provide some dramatic examples. 
 The Allied Chemical Kepone disaster in the 1970s was a local 
story from Hopewell, Virginia that broke during a slow news week for 
the national press, and thus found a strategic moment for attracting 
media attention.63 Allied Chemical had set up a small production fa-
                                                                                                                      
60 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.6 & cmts. 1, 4, 6, 7. 
61 As in Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., many public interest environmental controversies 
are characterized by a vast disparity in resources available to the parties. See Escamilla v. 
ASARCO, Inc., No. 91-CV-5716 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 23, 1993). 
62 See Johnson, supra note 6, at 598–600. 
63 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 48–65; see also William Goldfarb, Kepone: A Case 
Study, 8 Envtl. L. 645 (1978). The Kepone incident is scarcely visible in reported caselaw. 
Within the limited case law reported, some details about the case can be 
gleaned from a Tax Court decision rejecting Allied’s attempt to write off an 
in-lieu-of-penalties contribution to an environmental trust fund. Personal in-
jury cases such as Gilbert v. Allied Chem., . . . never resulted in a reported de-
cision. A federal criminal prosecution resulted in a court-ordered criminal 
settlement. A lawsuit ªled by ªshermen and seafood processors hurt by clo-
sure of the James River and Chesapeake Bay has interesting remedy issues, . . . 
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cility for processing its feed-stock chemicals to create an exportable 
pesticide, Kepone, a highly effective neurotoxin designed to kill po-
tato beetles, but so dangerous to humans that it could not be licensed 
in the United States, even under the minimal standards prevailing 
prior to the 1970s.64 In the Kepone facility, workers were regularly 
covered with toxic dust, carrying it home in their clothes to their 
families, where the dust could blow throughout the neighborhood, 
exposing children waiting at school bus stops and playing in the 
schoolyard.65 Eventually, a foreign-born doctor, who was not part of 
the local medical establishment—which had been ignoring the health 
effects of Kepone for years—blew the whistle on Allied Chemical to 
the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta.66 The workers’ blood sam-
ples showed higher Kepone toxicity levels than had ever been re-
corded in humans, along with evidence of sterility, organ failure, neu-
rological damage, and acute breathing difªculties.67
 As in Escamilla v. ASARCO, Inc., the defendant chemical giant, a 
major employer in a part of the state that proudly called itself the 
“chemical capital of the South,” normally might not have responded to 
the workers’ conditions.68 Allied reassured all of the local politicians 
and the public that none of the workers’ injuries had been scientiªcally 
traced to Kepone.69 But then an army of reporters from New York 
showed America the intense exposures suffered by the workers and 
their families, the employer’s casual disregard for safety, and company 
spokespersons’ evasive interviews.70 Video feeds of Kepone workers 
weeping at their kitchen tables as their bodies suffered involuntary 
                                                                                                                      
but gives little background on the case. An OSHA administrative penalty case 
focuses primarily on whether Moore and Hundtofte were personally liable for 
penalties. A major retrospective symposium on the Kepone incident appears in 
[the University of Richmond Law Review] 29 U. Rich. L.Rev. 493 (1995). 
Plater et al., supra note 4, at 48 n.11 (citations omitted). 
64 Plater et al., supra note 4, at 49–50. The satellite production facility was an un-
canny precursor to the maquiladora industrial facilities that have sprung up just across the 
Mexican border since the passage of NAFTA, where American companies can save on la-
bor costs and environmental compliance by moving their production into a much less 
stringent setting. See id. at 58. 
65 Id. at 54–55. 
66 Id. at 54. 
67 Id. at 54–55. 
68 Id. at 48, 57. 
69 See Goldfarb, supra note 63, at 645. 
70 In one famous incident, Allied complained that a CBS 60 Minutes reporter had “en-
trapped” the company spokesman into revealing that Allied had long known of the poison-
ings and had done nothing to stop it. Telephone Interview with Robert Sand, Esq. (Feb. 
1995). 
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convulsions touched a deep national nerve. Shortly after the media 
blitz began, the corporation decided to settle all claims without pro-
ceeding to trial.71 In Congress, the Allied Kepone story played a critical 
role in the hearings that led to the passage of the federal Clean Water 
Act Amendments of 1977.72
 Love Canal is another famous example of an early, national media 
occurrence that produced a direct and decisive effect on the framing of 
national environmental law.73 A small group of neighbors was horriªed 
to discover what was happening to their low-income community outside 
of Buffalo, New York.74 An industrial waste dump ªlled with Hooker 
Chemical toxins was given to the city, which decided to re-use it as a 
schoolyard.75 Toxic leachate began to seep up to the surface, burning 
children’s skin, while plumes of subsurface contamination leached 
through the ground into basements throughout the community.76 A 
neighborhood group, led by homemaker Lois Gibbs, managed to insti-
gate national coverage for the story, and eventually even the White 
House was forced to take note.77 Hooker Chemical was put on the de-
fensive, and the entire chemical industry was tarred with the revelation 
that disposal practices over dozens of years had been reckless and 
sloppy, with an “out of sight, out of mind” approach.78 Regardless of 
what the technical details of the arguments might have been,79 Love 
Canal became a media magnet, drawing congressional attention and 
                                                                                                                      
71 Plater et al., supra note 4, at 59. 
72 Id. at 57. In 1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments were 
passed with conspicuous gaps in coverage that were ªlled by the 1977 amendments creat-
ing the Clean Water Act. See William Goldfarb, Changes in the Clean Water Act Since Kepone: 
Would They Have Made a Difference?, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 603, 612 (1995). 
73 See generally Adeline Gordon Levine, Love Canal: Science, Politics, and People 
(1982). 
74 Id. at 27–38. 
75 Id. at 11–13. 
76 See generally id. 
77 See id. at 30, 36–37, 61, 175. 
78 See id. at 10–11. 
79 Hooker Chemical argued that much of the waste had come from a U.S. Army mili-
tary facility, not from their plant, and declared repeatedly that it had warned the local 
government of potential exposure hazards before it turned over the ªlled-in waste canal to 
the city. Associated Press, Court to Examine Role of Army at Love Canal, N.Y. Times, May 19, 
1991, at 27.The local government’s negligence led to putting a schoolyard atop the ªlled-
in Love Canal. Cathy Trost, Trading-Off at Hooker Chemical, APF Reporter, 1981, available at 
http://www.aliciapatterson.org/APF0402/Trost/Trost.html. 
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prompting the passage of several highly signiªcant pieces of federal 
toxic control legislation.80
 Starting in the early 1970s, the major federal development agen-
cies faced signiªcant public constraints upon their close business-as-
usual relationships with industrial coalitions in ªelds such as timber, 
ranching, mining, irrigation, agriculture, highway construction, and oil 
and gas. Media coverage played an important role in applying those 
constraints. One particularly dramatic example on the national stage 
was the Bureau of Land Management’s 1967 plan to dam the Colorado 
River within Grand Canyon National Park—a plan that would back the 
impounded waters of two reservoirs up through the Canyon.81 By fo-
cusing on the imminent desecration of a national monument being 
driven by narrow commercial gain, environmentalists were successfully 
able to rally public opinion and political opposition. The public’s dra-
matically negative reaction to the story led not only to the quashing of 
the federal agency plans, but also to strengthened public support for 
protecting wild places in their undeveloped condition.82
 These examples and others like them show the underlying real-
ity: media coverage is a behemoth. If the media covers a dramatic fac-
tual reality, the government process will be forced to respond.83 In the 
three examples above, the ofªcial players—corporations, organized 
industry associations, and the federal agencies involved—start out with 
substantial advantages. Public interest environmental attorneys’ ability 
to mobilize the media, with coverage that is vivid and persuasive, lev-
                                                                                                                      
80 Leonard O. Townsend, Note, Love Lies Bleeding: Brownªelds in the New Millennium, 11 
Fordham Envtl. L.J. 873, 874–77 (2000). The Love Canal fracas helped promote the 
passage of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) in 1981.See id. at 875–76. In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in 
1980, EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle speciªcally referenced “the continuing tragedy 
of Love Canal” as an example of the type of disaster that CERCLA might help prevent in 
the future. See Press Release, EPA, Costle Presses for Immediate Passage of Superfund 
(Sept. 11, 1980), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/cercla/03.htm. 
81 See generally Scott K. Miller, Undamming Glen Canyon: Lunacy, Rationality, or Prophecy, 
19 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 121 (2000). 
82 Media played a crucial role in saving the Grand Canyon Plan impoundment. Full 
page ads ran in the New York Times. Now Only You Can Save Grand Canyon from Being Flooded 
. . . for Proªt, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1966, at L35. The ad also ran on July 25, 1966. It is re-
markable how the early era of populist environmentalism was not compartmentalized into 
single-issue categories, such as air, water, toxics, wildlife, and resource exploitation; rather, 
these issues were generally viewed as multiple manifestations of the same systemic syn-
drome. Popular reactions against one environmental problem often spilled over into activ-
ism on other environmental issues. 
83 See supra notes 64–82 and accompanying text. 
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els the playing ªeld and allows the public debate to take place on 
more equal terms, despite the parties’ dramatic disparity in resources. 
 The linkages among law, media, and environmentalism at the 
macro level is most readily seen in the legislative and administrative 
fora, but the media posture of an issue also likely impacts major judi-
cial decisions. For example, early in the development of environmental 
law, milestone cases came before district court federal judges who had 
no prior exposure to the ªeld, and had an inherent skepticism to-
wards citizens challenging established federal and state agencies.84 
When the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) came into ef-
fect in 1970, for example, very few judges, not to mention President 
Richard Nixon who signed it, realized that it contained actionable 
legal requirements.85
 To understand NEPA in this context, consider the case of National 
Resources Defense Council v. Grant (Chicod Creek),86 which arose from a 
standard situation of collusion between the Weyerhaeuser Corporation 
and the federal Soil Conservation Service (SCS)—a division within the 
Department of Agriculture, now called the Natural Resources Conser-
vation Service—to drain ecologically valuable marshes and channelize a 
serpentine river, in order to produce more acreage for corporate yellow 
pine plantations.87 Under Public Law 566, federal taxpayer dollars were 
regularly channeled into many such projects so marginal that no pri-
vate owners would ever have spent their own money to construct 
them.88 As in many cases, however, despite the protests of local sports-
men and farmers against the Chicod Creek channelization, the federal 
agency certiªed the project for funding.89 The effect on wildlife would 
have been drastic, and many local farmers would have found their wa-
ter tables lowered to such an extent, especially in the month of August, 
that they could not cultivate crops effectively without artiªcial irriga-
tion.90 Without environmental law intervention, moreover, there would 
have been no practical prospect for stopping such a project, despite the 
fact that it made neither economic nor ecological sense.91
                                                                                                                      
84 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Grant (Chicod Creek), 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 
1972); Conªdential Interview with North Carolina Natural Resources Agency (1991). 
85 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 476–77. 
86 341 F. Supp. at 356; see Plater et al., supra note 4, at 479. 
87 See Chicod Creek, 341 F. Supp. at 362; see also Plater et al., supra note 4, at 479–80. 
88 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 479. 
89 See id. at 506. 
90 Conªdential Interview with North Carolina Natural Resources Agency, supra note 84. 
91 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 492–93 (discussing how NEPA enables litigation). 
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 The Chicod Creek case was brought before Judge John Larkins, a 
senior member of the North Carolina federal judiciary.92 Given his pre-
vious record, it may have been expected that he would defer to the 
ofªcial decision of the federal agency that is so closely linked to the 
state’s agribusiness lobby. With environmentalism being heavily covered 
in the newspapers and on television, however, Judge Larkins—like 
judges all over the United States—had increased incentive to take this 
environmental confrontation seriously.93 The operative provision of 
law— requiring an environmental impact statement for major federal 
action signiªcantly affecting the environment—could well have been 
interpreted by courts all over the country as a mere technicality to be 
satisªed by whatever minimal “statement” a federal agency involved in a 
challenged program or project might wish to present to the court.94 
NEPA’s legislative history clearly shows that Congress had not generally 
thought or wished that its provisions could be used to block ongoing 
pork barrel projects, which have been the lifeblood of legislative log-
rolling since the 1820s.95 Given the media’s attention to the environ-
ment in the early 1970s, however, Judge Larkins was instead prompted 
and emboldened to treat the statutory provision as a meaningful for-
mal requirement with which the federal agency had to comply, requir-
ing sufªcient detail to achieve the environmental analysis objective.96 
Despite protest from the SCS, Judge Larkins directed the agency to do 
an environmental impact statement, and then when it produced a con-
clusory, self-justifying statement long on reassurance and short on de-
                                                                                                                      
92 See Chicod Creek, 341 F. Supp. at 359. 
93 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 483, 492, 503–04. 
94 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2000). 
For example, an early Bureau of Reclamation statement for a major project in Galveston, 
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Palmetto Bend Project, Jackson County, Tex. Proposed construction of a 12.3-
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18,400 acres (11,300 of which will be inundated) will be committed to the 
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and shellªsh nursery areas will be impaired; habitat for such endangered spe-
cies as the Texas red wolf, the American alligator, the Southern bald eagle, 
the Peregrine falcon, and the Attwater prairie chicken will be lost. 
• Plater et al., supra note 4, at 487–88. The Bureau subsequently realized that more 
was required, and the project was ultimately subjected to the formal environmental impact 
statement process. Id. 
95 See Plater et al., supra note 4, at 476–78. 
96 See Chicod Creek, 341 F. Supp. at 368–69. 
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tails, Larkins rejected the impact statement and enjoined the channeli-
zation project, helping to establish a corpus of federal NEPA caselaw 
that made it one of the most effective environmental protection stat-
utes in the world.97
A. Counter-Reformation in the Politics of Environment, and  
Dissipation in Media Coverage 
 Since the early days of the development of environmental law, 
the interest groups attempting to blunt environmental protection law 
have become far more successful in the media and public opinion 
realm than public interest representatives. Starting with the corporate 
strategy memorandum written by Judge Lewis Powell shortly before 
he was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1972, industrial coalitions 
in the United States have crafted a comprehensive and coherent me-
dia strategy to reverse the public perceptions of themselves and of 
their environmental critics.98 In his memorandum to the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce Judge Powell argued: 
. . .[M]uch of the media—for varying motives and in varying 
degrees—either voluntarily accords unique publicity to these 
“attackers [of business]” or at least allows them to exploit the 
media for their purposes. This is especially true of television, 
which now plays such a predominant role in shaping the 
thinking, attitudes and emotions of our people. . . . 
 . . . . 
 Most of the media, including the national TV systems, are 
owned and theoretically controlled by corporations which 
depend upon proªts, and the enterprise system to survive. 
 . . . . 
[T]he time has come—indeed, it is long overdue—for the 
wisdom, ingenuity and resources of American business to be 
marshaled against those who would destroy it. 
 . . . . 
. . .[I]ndependent and uncoordinated activity by individual 
corporations, as important as this is, will not be sufªcient. 
Strength lies in organization, in careful long-range planning 
and implementation, in consistency of action over an 
                                                                                                                      
97 See id. at 369–70; Plater et al., supra note 4, at 506–07. 
98 See Memorandum from Lewis Powell to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Education 
Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), available at http://www2.bc. 
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indeªnite period of years, in the scale of ªnancing available 
only through joint effort, and in the political power available 
only through united action and national organizations. 
 . . . . 
 [Business interests should develop a strategy to take back 
the media, including monitoring of] the national television 
networks . . . in the same way that textbooks should be kept 
under constant surveillance. This applies . . . to the daily 
“news analysis” which so often includes the most insidious 
type of criticism of the enterprise system. [This has caused] 
the gradual erosion of conªdence in “business” and free en-
terprise. 
 This monitoring, to be effective, would require constant 
examination of the texts . . . of programs. Complaints—to 
the media and to the Federal Communications Commis-
sion—should be made promptly and strongly when pro-
grams are unfair or inaccurate. 
 Equal time should be demanded when appropriate. Effort 
should be made to see that the forum-type programs (the 
Today Show, Meet the Press, etc.) afford at least as much op-
portunity for supporters of the American system to partici-
pate as these programs do for those who attack it. 
 . . . . 
 If American business devoted only 10% of its total annual 
advertising budget to this overall purpose, it would be a 
statesman-like expenditure. 
 . . . . 
[B]usiness and the [free] enterprise system are in deep trou-
ble, and the hour is late.99
 Spurred and guided by this 1972 memorandum, the corporate 
opponents of progressive civic regulations have monitored and com-
plained of “liberal media bias,” and have developed a sophisticated 
two-pronged strategy to recapture media momentum in their areas of 
interest. On the one hand, they have sought to marginalize public in-
terest groups as groups of hippy extremists, rather than representa-
tives of what was perceived in the 1960s and 1970s as a very broad-
based, public recognition of deªciencies in ofªcial structures of gov-
ernment and corporate America. 
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 On the other hand, the regressive movement learned how to 
shape and target media coverage so as to blunt the arguments of public 
interest critics. They used the same media that shaped the progressive 
1960s to blunt the next generation’s progressive inclinations on con-
tested issues. Today, according to some observers, up to eighty percent 
of the public policy-oriented news in the popular media comes from 
conservative spokespersons, many of them from corporate “think 
tanks” and other adversarial institutions created by regulated indus-
try.100 Citizen public interest initiatives have to deal with a media bat-
tleground where the insiders lobbying against environmental protec-
tion have limitless resources and know how to play the game. 
 Led by the oil and gas industries, and receiving additional money 
from mining, ranching, homebuilding, and corporate agriculture 
groups, conservative foundations have developed sophisticated media 
operations and now operate highly-coordinated campaigns over long 
periods of time, including the payment of large stipends to conserva-
tive authors for the production of pro-industry “news” columns and 
books.101 The big, industry-oriented think tanks have fully-equipped 
television studios on premises, so that their “experts” can provide re-
porters on a deadline with sound bites that echo their sponsors’ point 
of view.102 Meanwhile, the consolidation of media has taken its toll on 
the press’s public information role.103 Coupled with the business-
efªciency marketing model imposed on news departments, which 
never before had been required to be proªt-generating divisions, the 
effect is to make the press far less aggressive in pursuing public inter-
est cases. Led by Reed Irvine, ultraconservative activists successfully 
nurtured the cliché of a supposed “liberal media” bias to induce re-
porters to back off from vigilance and adversarial investigations of 
public interest issues. Whereas in the 1980s and 1990s many media 
outlets had environmental reporters as regular members of their 
staffs, environmental journalism today has been eroded dramatically 
in both print and electronic media. 
                                                                                                                      
100 Lakoff, supra note 41, at 107. 
101 Id.; see Cathy Young, Cleaning House on Opinions for Hire, Boston Globe, Feb. 20, 
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the nation’s media outlets, but by 2000, this number was reduced to just six). 
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B. The Current Environmental Journalism Approach 
 A number of examples from recent environmental stories dem-
onstrate the drastic change in the media’s approach of environmental 
journalism. 
 At four minutes after midnight, Friday, March 24, 1989, the M/S 
Exxon-Valdez grounded hard onto the granite spine of Bligh Reef in 
the Gulf of Alaska’s Prince William Sound.104 Over the next weeks, at 
least eleven million gallons of oil from the wrecked single-hulled 
tanker blew westward, fouling more than one thousand miles of the 
Alaska coast, destroying stocks of ªsh and other wildlife, and hitting 
the economy of the state with a major recession.105
 Working with my students for the state of Alaska’s oil spill investi-
gative commission, it became clear that the cause of the oil spill disas-
ter was far more than a captain with a drinking problem. The records 
from the years prior to the wreck indicated that the Alyeska oil con-
sortium106 and the Coast Guard—the federal agency with primary au-
thority to regulate the safety and environmental compliance of the 
maritime oil trade—were constantly cutting back on safety measures 
and response capabilities to allow industry participants to save on op-
erating costs.107 In its report two years after the wreck, the state oil 
spill commission established that, owing to corporate and governmen-
tal “complacency,” the Exxon-Valdez spill had been an accident wait-
ing to happen.108
 With respect to this oil spill, however, the industry carefully ma-
nipulated the media coverage so that, despite hundreds of images of 
bedraggled birds and sealife, very few members of the public ever 
heard the moderated but highly critical conclusions of the ofªcial in-
vestigators.109 Alyeska and Exxon rented virtually all the local seaworthy 
                                                                                                                      
104 Riki Ott, Sound Truth and Corporate Myth$: The Legacy of the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill 6 (2005). 
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boats so that reporters could not make independent, on-site inspec-
tions of the oiled areas in the sound.110 The media had to rely on 
ofªcially sanctioned tours, which were careful to show conscientious 
cleanup operations, and provided interviews with people who would 
not talk about the systemic failures that produced the accident in the 
ªrst place.111 The cleanup of beaches with hot water and chemical 
emulsiªers was designed to make the visible oil go away, even though 
scientists desperately urged that the harsh surfactants were far more 
likely than the oil to damage the subsurface ecology of the beaches and 
the water column.112 Public attention instead was directed to a running 
series of revelations about Captain Hazelwood’s drinking problems 
over the years and in the hours prior to the tanker’s departure from 
Port Valdez.113
 The clear implications of the oil spill story, as it was framed, were 
that the spill was the fault of this captain, but that when the oil was no 
longer visible the disaster would be resolved and America could move 
on. The facts and the scientiªc realities—that the Exxon-Valdez spill 
resulted from systemic problems linked to corporate and agency cu-
pidity, and that the oil and cleanup chemicals released into the envi-
ronment would have severe, longterm effects on natural ecosystems 
and on closely affected human beings114—have been lost in the smog 
of spin. In the minds of most of the American public, and thus in the 
responses of government at both state and federal levels, the Exxon-
Valdez oil spill is a story of a drunken captain, and nothing more.115
 As another example, in many parts of the country, and particu-
larly in the Paciªc Northwest, forest clearcutting is one of the most 
drastic technologies for exploiting natural resources.116 Particularly 
                                                                                                                      
110 See Plater, supra note 107, at 671 n.31 (referencing the fact that the consortium lim-
ited reporter access to the oil spill disaster sites). 
111 See Ott, supra note 104, at 8. 
112 For a comprehensive account of the Exxon-Valdez Oil Spill and its consequences, 
see generally Ott, supra note 104. 
113 See, e.g., Carol Agus, And Speaking of Drinking, Newsday, Sept. 4, 1991, at 4. 
114 On one of my ºights back from Alaska, I sat next to a worker who had been forced, 
as he said many others had, to leave the cleanup area because the chemicals they were 
spraying were causing them to start peeing blood. See also Ott, supra note 104, at 52. The 
harm to humans working to clean up the visible oil on the rocky beaches has been vocifer-
ously denied by the oil industry, but is chronicled in Ott’s book. Id. at 21–181. 
115 See Agus, supra note 113; Reuters Media, supra note 113. 
116 Clearcutting has recently increased in the hills of the southeastern United States 
and many parts of the Mississippi and Atlantic drainages, which may be related to in-
creased ºooding conditions in these areas, though the correlation is at present only con-
jecture. 
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on publicly owned lands, timber companies cut all the living trees in a 
strand of forest, and, after removing all usable wood, burn the “slash” 
that remains.117 The consequence is an ecological nightmare. The 
number and diversity of native species—an accurate measure of the 
health of a natural environment—drop dramatically.118 There are 
many consequences beyond the clearcut acreage as well, with one of 
the most drastic being rapid erosive runoff, causing river valleys to ªll 
with silt, sand, and stones, increasing the speed, height, and severity 
of later downstream ºooding.119 In February 1996, the states of Ore-
gon and Washington experienced extremely severe ºooding, with 
whole villages inundated and homes swept downstream, resulting in a 
number of fatalities.120 Flood coverage saturated the media. Yet de-
spite the efforts of environmentalists to link the ºoods to upstream 
clearcutting practices that had turned many fragile mountain ecosys-
tems of the Northwest into eroded moonscapes, the national media 
consistently reported the ºoods as acts of God. The media failed to 
consider the contribution to ºooding from the widespread upstream 
forestry practices that, in hydrological terms, were clearly responsible 
for a substantial portion of the disasters.121
 The Bush Administration too has repeatedly offered paradigmatic 
examples of how media can be carefully stewarded to project public 
messages that are the antithesis of the underlying reality. A leaked 
copy of the memorandum prepared by GOP consultant Frank Luntz, 
released in 2003, makes clear how consciously the agenda of cutting 
back on environmental protection was to be portrayed to the public 
in the form of opposite illusions.122 Thus, the administration presents 
                                                                                                                      
117 Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory 
and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 981, 985 n.10 (1994). 
118 Id.; see also Comm. on Envtl. Issues in Paciªc Nw. Forest Mgmt., Nat’l Research 
Council, Environmental Issues in Paciªc Northwest Forest Management 63 (2000); 
T.D. Schowalter, Canopy Arthropod Community Structure and Herbivory in Old-Growth and Regener-
ating Forests in Western Oregon, 19 Canadian J. Forest Res. 318–22 (1989); T.D. Schowalter, 
Canopy Arthropod Communities in Relation to Forest Age and Alternative Harvest Practices in Western 
Oregon, 78 Forest Ecology & Mgmt. 115–25 (1995). 
119 Plater, supra note 117, at 985–86. 
120 Associated Press, Oregon Awash in Water World Flooding Brings Death, Destruction, St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 9, 1996, at 3A, available at 1996 WNLR 805316 (Westlaw). 
121 See, e.g., Jennifer Bjorhus et al., Four Dead in Two States River Rage—But Forecast Calls 
for Sun, Seattle Times, Feb. 9, 1996, at A1, available at http://archives.seattletimes. 
nwsource.com/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=2313316&date=19960209&qu-
ery=bjorhus. 
122 See Memorandum from Frank Luntz (2002), available at http://www.ewg.org/brief- 
ings/luntzmemo/pdf/LuntzResearch_environment.pdf. The pages available from the leaked 
memorandum were only 16 of at least 140 pages, but contained dramatic examples of how 
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the “Clear Skies Initiative,” the “Healthy Forest Initiative,” the “En-
dangered Species Recovery” bill, and the like. Faced with the avalanche 
of technical changes undercutting federal environmental protections, 
and uncertain about the facts, the press tends to report the admini-
stration’s explanations for its anti-environmental actions with limited 
critical analysis, and often with merely a perfunctory quote from an 
environmental spokesperson saying that the initiative may be envi-
ronmentally harmful.123
 The media’s inertia and general failure to focus on the current 
unprecedented initiatives against environmental protection has been 
accomplished in part by the current administration’s conscious deci-
sion to do most of its anti-environmental work outside the legislative 
forum, in the less-visible realms of out-of-court settlements and manipu-
lative tinkering with administrative rules deªnitions and enforcement 
procedures.124
 The current administration has learned the lessons of history.125 
In its assault on environmental statutes in the 1980s, the Reagan Ad-
ministration tried to undercut existing laws primarily on the ºoor of 
Congress, and largely failed because of insistent media coverage and 
the legislative opposition it rallied.126 In Newt Gingrich’s 104th Con-
gress under the “Contract with America,” the massive corporate initia-
tives against environmental law were again mostly legislative, and again 
were repulsed by strong leadership, particularly in the Senate by Re-
publican John Chafee.127
 Now, however, in the ongoing third and most comprehensive as-
sault against environmental protection laws,128 the current admini-
                                                                                                                      
Mr. Luntz, the consultant who came up with the idea for the “Contract with America,” ad-
vised how to blunt public reactions to the Bush Administration’s weakening of protections 
against toxics, and undermined public conªdence in the science of global warming. See id. at 
137. 
123 See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Proposes Change to Allow More Thinning of Forests, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 2002, at A32 ( “‘They make no bones about their attempt to exempt 
from environmental review whatever they say is going to be beneªcial.’” (quoting Niel 
Lawrence, Natural Resources Defense Council)). 
124 The 104th Congress’ “Contract with America” focused on the legislative forum, and 
was substantially blocked by media criticism, as well as a courageous stand in the Senate by 
Senators such as the late Rhode Island Republican Senator John Chafee. 
125 For an analytical history of assaults on federal environmental protection, see gen-
erally Plater, supra note 2; see also supra notes 89–98 and accompanying text. 
126 Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental Law, 87 
Minn. L. Rev. 999, 1027–30 (2003). 
127 Id. 
128 The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) continually updates its website 
cataloging the current Bush Administration’s ongoing initiatives against environmental 
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stration has acted largely through low-visibility shifts in regulatory 
deªnitions and procedures, as well as through litigation settlement 
strategies.129 Consider, for example, the administration’s undercutting 
of the standards and enforcement of the Clean Air Act’s retroªtting 
requirements by deªning the terms “maintenance” and 
“modiªcation” to exempt major factory reconstructions from being 
held to the more stringent requirements of new sources.130 In the 
realm of litigation, the administration welcomes erosive courtroom 
attacks on preexisting federal regulations by regulated industries, and 
then fails to defend the regulations against claims that they were ille-
gal, unconstitutional, or lacking in factual support.131
 For example, the Boise Cascade timber and paper corporation at-
tacked a Clinton Administration regulation protecting the wilderness 
status of forests in Utah and in the Northern Rockies by arguing that 
the designations were invalid because they had not been accompanied 
by environmental impact statements.132 When the case was called for 
trial, the Bush Administration attorney in the courtroom refused to 
even enter an appearance in defense of the federal regulation, at which 
point an environmental attorney successfully requested intervention to 
present arguments defending the federal government’s own regulation 
against invalidation.133 In most stories involving such collusive capitula-
tions by the federal authorities, however, environmental attorneys were 
not in a position to intervene. In a number of these cases, regulations 
have been struck down by district courts and have been subsequently 
tabled on a nationwide basis by the administration.134 An extraordinary 
                                                                                                                      
protection laws. Natural Resources Defense Council, The Bush Record, http://www.nrdc. 
org/bushrecord (last visited Apr. 23, 2006). 
129 See id. 
130 NRDC documents the assault. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, The 
EPA’s Changes to New Source Review: The Bush Administration’s Proposal to Weaken the Clean Air 
Act Threatens Public Health, Undermines State Authority, and Caves to Polluters, http://www. 
nrdc.org/air/pollution/pnsr.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2006). 
131 Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II, 14 
Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 363, 394–401 (2004). 
132 See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1106, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 
2002); see also Parenteau, supra note 131, at 395. 
133 Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1108; Parenteau, supra note 131, at 395–97. 
134 Alternatively, the federal government and the challenging entity enter into an out-
of-court agreement that the regulation will no longer be enforced. Parenteau, supra note 
131, at 394–401. In Kootenai Tribe, the environmental attorney, Professor Patrick Parenteau, 
took the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and successfully defended the federal 
regulation, despite the federal government’s desire not to defend it. In other cases, how-
ever, long-established regulations have been neutered by the administration’s strategy. See 
Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1108. 
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aspect of this occurence of widespread “collusive capitulation” is the 
almost complete failure of the media to note this dramatic phenome-
non, and how it has undercut environmental law. 
 More recent examples come from the climatic disasters of 2005. 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita focused the attention of the public 
through intense media coverage of terrible scenes of storm damage in 
the deep and middle South. Criticism of the administration’s federal 
emergency management procedures began even before the hurricanes 
hit.135 In the storms’ aftermath, realizing the power of public shock and 
empathy, the administration quickly attempted to deºect media atten-
tion onto the environmental movement, seeking both to deºect criti-
cism of its own performance and to accomplish further erosions of en-
vironmental regulations. A request went out from the White House 
through the Department of Justice to U.S. Attorney Ofªces around the 
country, asking them to ªnd examples where environmental litigation 
might have blocked ºood-control projects.136 Soon, the White House-
guided media, and the Fox network in particular, was blaming the 
“Green Left” for the depredations of Hurricane Katrina.137 It was ar-
gued that, in 1976, an environmental group had successfully gone to 
court to block a levee-building project in a stretch of Louisiana water-
front that could have saved New Orleans.138 The media reported those 
                                                                                                                      
135 A CNN interview is representative of this criticism: 
CNN Reporter: Are your teams, is FEMA ready for this? . . . 
FEMA’s Michael Brown: Well, we have been taxed. . . . But let me say to a 
whole bunch of critics. We are ready. We’re going to respond and we’re going 
to do exactly what we did in Florida and Alabama and the other places. We’re 
going to do whatever it takes to help victims. That’s why we’ve already de-
clared an emergency. President Bush had no reservations about doing that. 
State of Emergency Declared in Louisiana (CNN television broadcast, August 28, 2005) available 
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.03.html. 
136 “The Department of Justice emailed ªeld ofªces asking for evidence of ‘claims 
brought by environmental groups’ against other Corps projects to protect New Orleans.” 
David Schoenbrod, The Lawsuit that Sank New Orleans, Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 2005, at A18. 
137 See Michael Tremoglie, New Orleans: A Green Genocide, FrontPageMagazine.com, 
Sept. 8, 2005, http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=19418. 
138 Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Rush, 424 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. La. 1976); see, e.g., John 
Berlau, Greens vs. Levees, Nat’l Rev. Online, Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.nationalreview. 
com/comment/berlau200509080824.asp; R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., Eco-Catastrophe Echoes, 
Wash. Times, Sept. 16, 2005, at A19. 
As radical environmentalists continue to blame the ferocity of Hurricane Ka-
trina’s devastation on President Bush’s ecological policies, a mainstream Lou-
isiana media outlet inadvertently disclosed a shocking fact: Environmentalist 
activists were responsible for spiking a plan that may have saved New Orleans. 
Decades ago, the Green Left—pursuing its agenda of valuing wetlands and 
 
538 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 33:511 
press releases as if they constituted legitimate news, without investigat-
ing the particulars, despite the fact that engineers and environmental 
law professors quickly produced a factual analysis showing that the 
criticized litigation did not block control efforts in the subject area, but 
rather forced the choice of a preferable and more effective alterna-
tive.139 The conservative media nevertheless continued to imply that 
environmentalists, rather than federal and state lassitude, bear 
signiªcant blame for the disasters in Louisiana and Mississippi. 
 Even more representative of the current dysfunction of environ-
mental media is the use of hurricane shock to justify and shield direct 
assaults on environmental statutes.140 Several statutory exemptions 
were immediately implemented without any showing of emergency ne-
cessity.141 Under the cover of public and media preoccupation with the 
hurricane disasters, moreover, Representative Richard Pombo, a long-
standing foe of environmental protection laws, took advantage by ad-
vancing low-visibility efforts to undercut two of the most signiªcant fed-
eral environmental laws, NEPA and the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).142 The taskforce in the House Committee on Resources had 
                                                                                                                      
topographical “diversity” over human life—sued to prevent the Army Corps of 
Engineers from building ºoodgates that would have prevented signiªcant 
ºooding . . . . 
Tremoglie, supra note 137, at 1. “Congress OK’d a project to protect New Orleans 40 years 
ago, but an environmentalist suit halted it.” Ralph Vartabedian & Peter Pae, A Barrier That 
Could Have Been, L.A. Times, Sept. 9, 2005, at A10. 
A panel of environmental law experts studied the New Orleans ºooding and its rela-
tionship to prior environmental cases, ªnding that the cause-and-effect claims were wholly 
unfounded. See Donald T. Hornstein, et al., Broken Levees: Why They Failed, available at 
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/CPR_special_Levee_Report.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 23, 2006). 
139 Hornstein et al., supra note 138, at 3–6. However, neither of the alternatives being 
litigated had been designed to handle a Category 5 hurricane, which Katrina was thought 
to be. Id. at 1. Despite the environmentalists’ desire to have NEPA analysis based on “worst 
case analysis,” the Corps of Engineers generally designed its projects only to control a 
Category 3 hurricane or weaker. Plater et al., supra note 4, at 508. 
140 See, e.g., Threatened and Endangered Species Recovery Act of 2005, H.R. 3824, 
109th Cong. (2005) (as passed by House, Sept. 30, 2005). 
141 NRDC’s “Media Watch” documents attempts by Congress and the administration to 
use Katrina and the need to rebuild as justiªcation for waiving environmental protections. 
In the aftermath of the hurricane, EPA drafted legislation that would allow it to waive pro-
visions of the Clean Air Act, including those concerning toxic emissions and health-based 
air quality standards nationwide, without public notice or comment if the administration 
declares an emergency. See Press Release, Natural Resources Defense Council, White 
House, Congress Exploiting Hurricane to Weaken Health, Environmental Protections 
(Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/pressreleases/050922a.asp. 
142 See H.R. 3824. 
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been accumulating industry complaints against NEPA prior to the hur-
ricanes, with the goal of making amendments to dilute NEPA’s envi-
ronmental impact statement requirement. Once the hurricane struck, 
Representative Pombo quickly drafted a second bill to undercut 
signiªcant sectors of the ESA as well.143 With no prior publicity, he in-
troduced the bill, held an afternoon hearing two days later, and within 
ten days brought the bill to the ºoor, where it passed with only desul-
tory notice in a chamber preoccupied with hurricane disaster relief.144 
The media could have made quite a story out of Pombo, his bills, and 
the surprising speed and obscurity of the ESA bill he brought to the 
ºoor.145 The media, however, barely noticed the maneuver, and despite 
environmentalists’ dismayed criticism of the ghoulish opportunism un-
der cover of disaster, no media outlet thought it worthy of investigation. 
 One ªnal example is illustrative of these trends. Working with my 
students, I spent seven years in a major battle trying to secure the fed-
eral ESA and apply it to an ill-considered Tennessee Valley Authority 
dam project. The diminutive Tellico Dam project was a proposal to 
condemn more than 300 family farms for a recreational reservoir and 
land development, with no electric generators, eliminating the last 
thirty-three miles of ºowing, high-quality water left in the eastern 
Tennessee River system.146 Over the seven years, the local citizens ul-
timately showed not only the illegality of the project under ESA, but 
also demonstrated its dramatically uneconomic cost-beneªt merits; 
they made it clear that public resources would be far better invested 
in a river-based program, with sixty square miles of agricultural land 
returned to farmers.147
 The problem with the Tellico Dam controversy was not that the 
media failed to run stories on the conºict between the dam and a di-
minutive endangered snail darter ªsh. Rather, it was that the media sys-
                                                                                                                      
143 See id. 
144 Id. 
145 Media coverage of Mr. Pombo could have been built on the record of his 1995 
hearings against the ESA held around the nation, where orchestrated crowds of ranchers, 
irrigators, timber industry workers, and others were encouraged to vilify the law and envi-
ronmentalists, in one case driving to tears a class of third-graders and their teacher. They 
had come to testify that, with careful and empathic planning in cooperation with ranchers, 
cattle could coexist with endangered fairy shrimp living in local streams. See Hanna Rosin, 
Fern Trampling, New Republic, July 3, 1995, at 12. 
146 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Snail Darter, The Tellico Dam, and Sustainable De-
mocracy—Lessons For the President From a Classic Environmental Law Controversy, 2001 
Mercer Law School Internet Virtual Lecture Series (Feb. 12, 2001), http://www.law.mer- 
cer.edu/elaw/zygplater.html. 
147 See id. 
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tematically got the story wrong, mischaracterizing the litigation as ex-
tremism.148 As covered in the press, the story was a misbegotten version 
of David and Goliath, a “three-inch minnow” counterpoised against a 
“huge federal hydroelectric dam,” with the subtext that, in this itera-
tion, David was illegitimate.149 Despite the citizens’ best efforts—a re-
lentless series of press packets, press conferences for farmers to tell the 
true story, letters to editors, and calls to more than 120 reporters—the 
sobering, impressive facts of the snail darter’s economic case were 
never covered in the national media. No investigative reporter ever 
went to Tennessee and reported on the merits of the dam project, even 
though the story was one of the three most-covered environmental me-
dia stories in that decade, and despite the fact that a cabinet-level 
committee had unanimously concluded that the project was not worth 
completing in economic terms.150 From the beginning, the citizen 
plaintiffs were unsuccessful in framing the story on its actual terms, and 
the prodevelopment, anti-environmental forces in Washington and na-
tionally were able to use the miscaricature of the putatively ridiculous 
endangered ªsh to undercut the legal case in Congress, and to scare 
President Carter into withdrawing his promise to veto the rider that 
ordered the ªnishing of the dam and the elimination of the farmlands 
and the ecosystems of the Little Tennessee River Valley.151
 So many of these modern stories present a common puzzle— 
where is the liberal media? Most often, the problem is not media bias, 
but rather that many important environmental stories are barely cov-
ered or are not covered at all. As Dean John Garvey noted in his in-
troductory comments to this symposium, the modern environmental 
media often offers a new take on an old philosophical question “if a 
                                                                                                                      
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 After an exhaustive review of cost-beneªt calculations when the dam was almost 
completed, the verdict was dramatic: “The interesting phenomenon is that here is a pro-
ject that is 95 percent complete, and if one takes just the cost of ªnishing it against the 
[total] beneªts, and does it properly, it doesn’t pay, which says something about the origi-
nal design!” Charles Schultz, Chairman, Council on Economic Advisers, Endangered Spe-
cies Committee, Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project 25–26 (1979) (on ªle with author). 
According to a journalism professor at the University of Michigan who analyzed envi-
ronmental news coverage in that decade, the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Tellico Dam 
story was one of three top environmental stories in terms of national news coverage, along 
with Love Canal and the Alaska Lands congressional decisional process. Almost all the 
coverage, however, was superªcial. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Essay, Law and the Fourth Estate: 
Endangered Nature, the Press, and the Dicey Game of Democratic Governance, 32 Envtl. L. 1, 1 
(2002). 
151 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm 
and Its Consequences, 19 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 805, 813–14 (1986). 
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tree is cut down in a wilderness area and no one puts it on CNN, has 
it really happened?”152
 The media in the United States has a high calling. As Thomas 
Jefferson wrote in 1820, “I know no safe depository of the ultimate 
powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them 
not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome 
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their 
discretion . . . .”153
 In our democratic system as it exists today, the virtually exclusive 
source of material to “inform the discretion of the people” on current 
events is the media. The shared experience of our national media, 
moreover, is part of what makes our nation a democratic community.154 
The media is thus arguably the primary source of information for our 
system of democratic governance. What the media brings into focus will 
be taken into account in the halls of government because the gover-
nors know it is being perceived by the public. Near the end of the bat-
tles over the Tellico Dam, all the Members of Congress had a ªnal op-
portunity to vote on the merits of the case, which, by then, were clear 
on the ofªcial record. Each Member received a letter from the Secre-
tary of Interior as Chairman of the congressionally mandated cabinet-
level review committee detailing its ªndings and unanimous conclusion 
that the ºowing river was still economically preferable to the reservoir. 
The Senators and Representatives could uphold the law, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                      
152 John Garvey, Dean, Boston College Law School, Introductory Remarks at the Bos-
ton College Environmental Affairs Law Review Symposium: Environmental Law’s Path 
Through the 4th Estate: Environmental Law and the Media (Oct. 6, 2005). 
153 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 10 The 
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 161 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899). 
154 See id. 
The free press is an absolute value not only because the unfettered ºow of in-
formation is essential to the republican system, nor only because the fourth 
estate serves as a check on the power of the other three, but because public 
expression is necessary for the communal self-awareness that keeps the body 
politic alive. You routinely turn to the newspaper each morning not only to 
learn what happened, but to stroke the otherwise intangible bond you share 
with the neighbors and strangers in whose company you will spend the day. 
 Reading the morning paper is like tagging up, a literal “touching wood,” a 
dispelling of the darkness of night, all done in the knowledge that everyone 
else is doing the same thing, which gives you not only a place to start the day 
from, but a reassurance that you are not alone in your concern for the com-
mon good. The news media do for democracy what liturgy does for religion; 
what poetry does for experience; what gesture does for feeling. With words 
out of silence, the press tells you who you are. 
• Carroll, supra note 1, at A15. 
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Court’s injunction, and the review committee’s record, or they could 
override the law and allow an economically dysfunctional project, 
pushed by the pork barrel, to roll on, unhindered. The legislators voted 
by a wide margin in the House and a narrower margin in the Senate to 
go with the pork barrel and override the law.155 The problem was not 
that the Members of Congress did not know the economic facts, but 
that they knew that the American public did not know, and were therefore 
able to go along with the usual insider pork barrel process.156 It is 
therefore not only disappointing, but also dangerous in a constitutional 
sense, if the media does not inform the public, in a timely fashion, of 
the facts and issues that are contending in the legislative forum. 
IV. Modern Environmental Media Coverage:  
Why the Shortfall? 
 The problem revealed by these and many other environmental 
law controversies is that, even though an issue has extreme public im-
portance, the media may not cover the story, or it may cover the story 
and frame it in a way that hides the public interest, as when the indus-
trial lobbies’ press ofªces spin and frame a story so as to minimize the 
merits of the issue.157 In some cases, the media picks up a story but 
drops it too soon, abandoning it before the decisive moment of an 
agency hearing, a committee markup, or a vote on the ºoor.158 At 
                                                                                                                      
155 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, ‘Those Who Care About Laws and Sausages Shouldn’t Watch 
Them Being Made,’ L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 1979, § V, at 5. 
156 See id. 
157 See supra notes 41–52 and accompanying text. 
158 My students and I worked on an initiative to regulate advertising billboards along 
state highways in Michigan. The billboard lobby is typically very powerful in state capitals; 
in this case, to avoid meaningful regulatory constraints, the billboard lobbyists were seek-
ing quick passage of a preemptive bill, Senate Bill 517, that, under the guise of regulation, 
would speciªcally allow high-density billboarding, and set maximum billboard sizes at 
more than 6000 square feet. On the day of the Senate vote, a large group of students, in-
cluding volunteers from the University of Michigan School of Engineering, traveled up to 
Lansing and erected a 3000 square foot sign on the capitol lawn with text stating, “If Sen-
ate Bill 517 passes, billboards over TWICE this size will be allowed! Keep Michigan Beauti-
ful—Defeat S.B. 517!” University of Michigan Billboard Protest, http://www2.bc.edu/ 
%7Eplater/Newpublicsite05/Billboard01Photo.jpg (last visited Apr. 24, 2006). The sign 
drew the attention of legislators and staff throughout the capitol building and caused ra-
dio, television, and print reporters to make this the lead story on every local outlet. As a 
result, the lobby withdrew the bill for the indeªnite future. Three weeks later, when stu-
dents were in exams and media attention had passed on, the lobbyists had their legislators 
bring S.B. 517 to the ºoor again, and it was passed into state law, where it remains. 
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other times, the media may pick up the story too late to inform the 
policy making process.159
 Why is it that so many important stories at the macro level of na-
tional policy, as well as at the micro level, receive inadequate or skewed 
coverage from the media, democracy’s most essential information ser-
vice? There are a host of potential explanations, none of them readily 
acceptable in a modern industrial democracy: 
 • Complexity. Environmental stories may be too complex to be 
summarized in a three-second quip or a twenty-second sound bite, forc-
ing reporters or public interest advocates into unsuccessful attempts to 
distill a comprehensive analysis to a superªcial summary, or risk a 
glazed-over look from an editor or producer conveying the message 
that “our audience will never understand that.” 
 • Uncertainty. Environmental stories often involve distracting un-
certainties—there may be serious risks of harm possible in a given situa-
tion, but they may be difªcult to prove in terms of probability or scale. 
The environmental “precautionary principle” argues that a society 
should worry about major problems which may occur—even without 
proof that they are certain to occur—if there are reasonable indications 
that the risk is real.160 Faced with industry’s tendency to doubt and 
minimize most newly perceived technological risks, however, the press 
often reacts to public-interest warnings, like the global warming story, 
by emphasizing the uncertainties until very late in the game. 
 • Acute-but-chronic. As Phil Shabecoff has said, an inherent prob-
lem with many environmental stories is that the harms they discuss are 
acute but chronic; that is, that they have been in existence and expanding 
over such a long time that there is not a “milestone moment” to focus 
the public’s immediate attention on the issue.161 Love Canal, the Allied 
Kepone disaster, and the crash of the Exxon-Valdez each provided a 
focal moment.162 In many environmental cases, however, it is difªcult 
                                                                                                                      
159 For example, throughout the seven years of the snail darter-Tellico Dam contro-
versy, we desperately tried to get the story to the national press corps. Only when the pork 
barrel rider bill passed and the President failed to veto it did we get a roomful of reporters 
to attend a press conference. At that session, environmental journalist Phil Shabecoff bit-
terly stated that the full story just presented “should have been presented to us years ago!” 
Press packets and data sheets had been repeatedly distributed to all the national news ser-
vices and newsrooms in Washington over the prior years. Farmers, Cherokees, and Tennes-
see biologists had come to Washington and sought out press interviews. The press had just 
never gotten around to paying attention until the case’s conclusion. 
160 Plater et al., supra note 4, at 14, 1268–72. 
161 Telephone Interview with Philip Shabecoff, Reporter, N.Y. Times (Sept. 29, 2005). 
162 See Plater et al., supra note 4, 42–66, 182. 
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to ªnd strategic news moments. For example, it is difªcult to bring pub-
lic focus upon hormonal changes and other longterm metabolic effects 
caused by environmental chemical exposures, though their conse-
quences for the sustainable future welfare of human society may be far 
greater than pollution.163
 • Gloom. The media is often quick to cover vivid stories of short-
term disasters—tsunamis, earthquakes, terrorist attacks, plane crashes, 
and famines. Environmentalists trying to gain media attention may too 
often succumb to the temptation to portray their issues as imminent 
disasters, hoping to attract the press’s ªckle eye. This may be twice-
disadvantageous because it both encourages hyperbole at the expense 
of sober factual analysis, and raises cynical doubts about environmental-
ism generally. It can lead to public “disaster fatigue,” and may evoke an 
image of environmentalism as the new “dismal science,” dragging us all 
into lachrymose dudgeon rather than ªnding bright paths for the fu-
ture.164
 • Media is now a business. “Infotainment” means that news must 
be packaged to sell. Lurking behind much of the disappointing reality 
of modern media is a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, 
the exalted mandate of the media is to provide citizens and govern-
ment with the essential factual raw materials—and a marketplace of 
opinions—that will support a full panoply of public issue debates and 
thus shape dynamic, reasoned, democratic government decisionmak-
ing. On the other hand for a variety of reasons the nation’s press has 
come to consider local, national, and international news largely as just 
another revenue-generator, and therefore have reorganized the entire 
news-providing function as a consumer commodity competing for 
                                                                                                                      
163 The ignorance of Americans about processes and issues in domestic and interna-
tional politics is evident in many public polls. For example, a recent Harris poll conducted 
for the American Bar Association released in December 2005, revealed that only 55% of 
the American public could correctly identify the three branches of government; 22% 
named the branches Democrat, Republican, and Independent, and 16% named them 
local, state, and federal. See Harris Poll Reveals Governmental Knowledge of Many Americans, 
Daily Record (Rochester, N.Y.), Dec. 13, 2005. Additionally, 29% of the public answered 
that the role of the judiciary is to advise the President and Congress on the legality of fu-
ture actions. See id. 
164 In the snail darter case, for example, reporters demonstrated great reluctance to 
acknowledge the fallen reality of the contemporary Tennessee Valley Authority, the agency 
that had been one of the New Deal’s brightest roses, a beacon of progressive social policy 
now turned to dross. In the course of my seven years of work on the snail darter case, I was 
repeatedly told by reporters that their previous view of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
formed by schoolbooks and magazines, had been of a progressive success story, quite at 
variance from the reality of a utility-oriented pork barrel political establishment. 
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maximum market share.165 Stories that are too complicated, depress-
ing, or continuations of ongoing stories that are undramatic, are thus 
deemed not sufªciently attractive to the prized audience sectors. The 
news shows that will get on the air are those that attract the biggest 
product-buying audience in the format that attracts them. 
 • Media as Marketing. Is the average American Homer Simpson? 
One unfortunate cause of the low level of press coverage on matters 
of public importance may be the media’s general impression that the 
American audience is unsophisticated scientiªcally and politically, and 
uninterested in complex issues of societal governance.166 Gauging 
potential media audience numbers is a process of marketing analysis. 
For better or worse, the news business today is a business, and its mar-
keting logic often pegs the product at the level and format deemed 
likely to attract the largest block of American consumers. The percep-
tion, it seems, is not necessarily that the American media audience or 
the American voter is stupid so much as ignorant, in the sense of un-
informed and unknowing. An uninformed audience spawns a perni-
cious spiral: because the consumers of media are uninformed, they 
lack interest in getting more information about important issues of 
societal governance. Because the uninformed audience is uninterested, 
the media businesses that could supply society with important infor-
mation feel little market pressure to do so. 
                                                                                                                      
165 Twenty years ago, many or most electronic media news departments and newspa-
pers operated with a professional sense of responsibility as the public’s source of informa-
tion, despite the substantial cost of maintaining reporters around the world. In 1986, 
NBC’s News cost the network as much as $100 million a year. See Marc Gunther, The Trans-
formation of Network News, Nieman Reports (Special Issue), Summer 1999, at 20, 21; see 
also Sarah Sun Beale, The News Media’s Inºuence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven 
News Promoted the Punitiveness Revolution ( Jan. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on ªle with 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review). The ªnancial burdens were treated as 
the price of enjoying bandwidth monopolies on the airwaves and recompense for the privi-
lege of operating national networks. Since the early 1980s, however, the traditional news 
audience has declined precipitously, and network and newspaper consolidation has led to 
large-scale corporations that expect revenue production from all divisions, and pressures 
for generating proªts. General Electric bought NBC, Capital Cities Communications bought 
ABC, and Laurence Tisch, a hotel and theater entrepreneur, took over CBS. Subsequently 
Disney bought ABC and Viacom took over CBS. For a review of these moves and their con-
sequences, see James T. Hamilton, All the News That’s Fit to Sell: How the Market 
Transforms Information into News 160–89 (2004). The corps of reporters—especially 
expensive foreign-posted reporters—has been cut back substantially, and news formats are 
now dominated by less expensive “infotainment,” “soft” features, with shrunken commit-
ments to actual news reporting. See Beale, supra at 20. 
166 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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 The perception of the American audience as uninformed and 
indiscriminate regarding issues of social policy and governance is un-
fortunately furthered by the way that American journalists are gener-
ally coached in how to present the news. The Fogg Index is an elabo-
rate method by which the text of journalistic stories is scaled in terms 
of relative education levels.167 According to several reporters, most 
American media target the level of their discourse at a Fogg Index of 
an eighth-grade reading level or lower. Only a few national newspa-
pers target their text at a Fogg Index level of high school graduate or 
higher.168 It is true that the complexity or reading level of a text’s syn-
tax does not necessarily equate with the reader’s level of reasoning or 
analytical and logical ability, but observation of mass media suggests 
that a convincing case can be made that the material being transmit-
ted is as low in brainpower as it is in syntax. 
 • Hooks and legs. Journalism experts often inform public inter-
est attorneys that a successful news story ªrst needs a “hook,” and 
then it needs to have “legs.” A hook can be a milestone moment, or a 
vivid occasion that makes the story immediately saleable in the news-
room. The hook can be a dramatic announcement in a public forum, 
or a surprising major spokesperson saying it, or a vivid photograph 
that captures the imagination and pulls in all who see it. In the 
Exxon-Valdez oil spill, photographs of oiled birds and sealife provided 
a hook that captured the nation’s imagination.169 If a hook is not ac-
curately related to the essence of the story, however, it may pull public 
attention in the wrong direction. The image of a drunken sea captain, 
the causation hook in the Exxon-Valdez story, is a good illustration.170
                                                                                                                      
167 See Checking Out Readability: The Fogg Index, Best Practice Briefs (University-Com- 
munity Partnerships, Michigan State University), June 2005, at 4, 4 available at http://out- 
reach.msu.edu/bpbriefs/issues/brief33.pdf. 
168 Consider the issue of global warming in the American media. A FoxNews.com cli-
mate change story rated a 29, making it understandable to someone between eleventh and 
twelfth grade. See Robert Roy Britt, 2005 Ties for 2nd Warmest Year Ever, but Cause Still Uncer-
tain, FoxNews.com, Jan. 9, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,180896,00.html. 
A CNN.com story scored a 32, making it understandable to a high school graduate. See 
2005 Was Australia’s Hottest Yet, CNN.com, Jan. 4, 2006. A New York Times story scored a 35, 
making it understandable to someone who spent two years in college. See Nicholas D. Kris-
tof, A Paradise Drowning, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 2006, at A15. 
Calculations for each story were based on a test of the ªrst 300 words of each. Stories 
were selected by searching the term “climate change” on each news organization’s website 
and selecting the most recent story actually about global warming. 
169 See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trust Council, Gallery, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/ 
Gallery/gallery-spill.htm#nogo (last visited Apr. 24, 2005). 
170 See Palast, supra note 106. 
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 Once media attention has been brought onto a story, it must also 
have legs to continue running as long as necessary to build momen-
tum and to register in the ongoing legal and political process. News 
coverage can be a ºash-in-the-pan or can peak too soon. All too often, 
a story that is dramatically covered one week becomes yesterday’s news, 
leaving the inside players free to return to the standard operating pro-
cedures that caused the problem in the ªrst place. 
 • Journalists. It may also be argued that modern media environ-
mental coverage is poor because many reporters are ignorant about 
current issues of law and resources policy, vulnerable to Tobacco Insti-
tute “scientiªc data,” and rely on public relations quotes rather than 
research. One wonders about the curriculum taught in journalism 
schools. In fact, many of the high-functioning journalists one meets 
never went to journalism school, and instead come to the press after 
learning some particular discipline or subject matter. The best jour-
nalists become, to some degree, scholars of the ªelds on which they 
report. They are quick studies at probing for underlying explanations 
of what is going on and what it means for society. Many ordinary 
journalists—and their editors and producers—are satisªed to report 
the latest press releases from inside players. Too often, they merely 
present juxtaposed sound bites from opposing sides of an issue, along 
the lines of this: 
 Dr. A., speaking for environmentalists, says “Global warm-
ing, caused in signiªcant part by human actions, is an ac-
cepted scientiªc fact in the international community of clima-
tologists, so we must do something about it.” 
 On the other hand, Dr. B., speaking from the Heritage 
Foundation, says “There are serious questions whether global 
warming exists, and if it does, whether it isn’t just a natural cy-
cle, and in any event the hydrocarbon industry has not been 
proved to cause it, so we need more studies.” 
                                                                                                                      
 The Fable of the Drunken Skipper has served the oil industry well. It trans-
forms the most destructive oil spill in history into a tale of human frailty—a ter-
rible, but one-time, accident. But broken radar, missing equipment, phantom 
spill personnel, faked tests, the proªt-mad disregard of law—all these made the 
spill disaster not an accident but an inevitability. 
 The canard of the alcoholic captain has also provided effective camouºage 
for British Petroleum’s involvement in the environmental catastrophe . . . . 
Id. 
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 There you have it: the news on global warming. Good 
night. 
 As Ross Gelbspan has said, if a controversy concerns arguments 
over policy, then of course a reporter should appropriately present 
quotes from both sides to let the audience follow the debate. If the con-
troversy is over matters of fact, however, reporters have an obligation to 
look into those facts so as to be able to indicate to their audience which 
propositions are factual and which are not.171 To do less is abdicating a 
societal responsibility, protracting informational dysfunctions, and 
promoting a system of governance by cynical spin. If the journalistic 
profession is to respond to Thomas Jefferson’s clarion challenge, it is 
clear that the press must treat itself as more than a bunch of perform-
ers on an infotainment stage. 
 • The public, too, is both part of the problem and the solution. If 
some of the foregoing is accurate, some of the unfortunate shortcom-
ings of modern media in the environmental ªeld and beyond can be 
traced not only to the dysfunctional dynamics of the media industry, 
but also to a national population that fails to demand more from the 
media. At this level of generality, one can talk about a need for a bet-
ter national educational system and other systemic issues, but the util-
ity of such perceptions is limited. 
 • Looking to the future. A signiªcant increase in environmental 
lawyers’ media sophistication may help resolve some of the media 
realm’s shortcomings. Environmental lawyers at the macro and micro 
level are not doing enough, or are not doing well enough, in conveying 
their issues into public opinion. Environmentalists can and should 
work to improve their ability to communicate important public interest 
facts and analysis to the public and inºuence the governance process. 
At the macro level, the relative lack of media resources for public inter-
est groups, compared to the oppositional groups that are arguing 
against environmental protection initiatives, is a problem that can and 
should be addressed by progressive foundations. Given the current 
revolution in electronic information technology, it may well be time for 
the creation of an electronic public interest, factual-analysis cyberspace 
clearinghouse, which, if properly conceived and implemented, could 
                                                                                                                      
171 How, for instance, would a thinking public react to a news story reporting that “The 
UN released its climate change report on Monday afternoon. On the other hand, the 
White House said the UN did not release the report. There you have it, the latest news on 
the climate change report release-date question.” The obvious logical reaction, in such 
cases of questions of fact, would be to expect journalists to check it out and tell the audi-
ence whether the UN report was actually issued. 
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change the nature of modern political discourse in our embattled pub-
lic interest ªelds.172
 At the micro level, public interest attorneys must learn the mod-
ern skills of media-savvy communication. They must master how to 
put together press conferences and press packets with maps, charts, 
and other essential information; how to conduct brieªngs for individ-
ual reporters; how to get coverage through op-ed features, letters to 
the editor, and electronic outlets around the country; and how to cul-
tivate relationships with intelligent journalists at all levels. Environ-
mental attorneys must be able to frame and create graphic messages 
relevant to their cause. 
 At every turn, at both the micro and macro levels of governance, 
citizens working in the public interest are altogether too likely to face 
opponents who are able to deploy far greater press resources. In fun-
damental terms, however, facts are facts, and ultimately society as a 
whole must learn how to perceive the important facts of the issues it 
deals with, or suffer unfortunate consequences. To make that happen 
is part of the environmental lawyer’s job which, if done right, could 
usher in a far happier era, where public debate and public policy are 
increasingly based not on a dense fabric of agenda-driven spin, but on 
thoughtful consideration of important things as they really are. 
                                                                                                                      
172 See Plater, supra note 150, at 35–36. 
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